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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Article VIII, § 4 of the Utah Constitution, § 78-2-2(3), Utah Code
Annotated (1953) (1987 Replacement), and Rule 3(a), Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered by the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Court Judge, Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, in favor of U.S. Life
Title Insurance Company of Dallas (hereinafter referred to as
"U.S. Life Title")(incorrectly referred to in plaintiff's
complaint as "U.S. Title Insurance Company of Dallas") which
dismissed the Complaint of Valley Bank and Trust Company ("Valley
Bank" or "the Bank") with prejudice.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review in this
case:
1.

Did Valley Bank's placing of its "SBA Trust Deed" on

property covered by a title insurance policy insuring a subsequent
trust deed "create" a defect, lien or encumbrance within the
meaning of a policy exclusion?
2.

Did U.S. Life Title owe a duty to Valley Bank to

disclose in its commitment of title insurance or its policy the
existence of the prior trust deed held by Valley Bank?

3.

May Valley Bank for the first time on appeal raise

the issue of equitable estoppel?
4.

Inasmuch as the first trust deed lien on the subject

property has been released, has Valley Bank suffered any loss as a
result of the existence of that trust deed at the time of the
issuance of the Title Insurance Policy?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
U.S. Life Title believes that Valley Bank's brief
accurately reflects the nature of the case and the course of
proceedings below.
Statement of Facts
1.

Valley Bank, a Utah corporation, is a wholly owned

subsidiary of Valley Utah Bancorporation.
p. 3; T. 3.)

(Brief of Appellant,

Valley Mortgage Corporation ("Valley Mortgage") is

also a wholly owned subsidiary of Valley Utah Bancorporation.
_d.) Valley Mortgage often acts as an agent for Valley Bank in
arranging for and closing Valley Bank mortgage loans (T. 18).
2.

On or about April 1, 1983, the department of Valley

Bank charged with making loans guaranteed by the Small Business
Administration of the United States ("the SBA Department") made a
loan in the sum of $65,000.00 to F. Kent Nance and Patricia J.
Nance.

(Hereinafter the said loan will be referred to as the "SBA

Loan" and the trust deed which secured payment of that loan will
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be referred to as the "SBA Trust Deed".)

The SBA Loan was secured

by a trust deed lien on the Nances' residence located in Summit
County, Utah, and by a security interest in certain personal
property.

(Valley Bank Complaint, If 7, R.3; T. 98; plaintiffs

exhibit 6.)

The SBA Trust Deed was recorded April 5, 1983.

(Plaintiffs exhibit 6.)
3.

A few weeks after obtaining the SBA Loan the Nances

contacted Valley Bank or Valley Mortgage for the purpose of
obtaining a conventional mortgage loan, ostensibly for the purpose
of paying off a prior mortgage held by another lender, First
Security Bank.

(T. 25-26.)

The Nances apparently did not

disclose to the loan officer that they had recently obtained the
SBA Loan from Valley Bank.
4.

(T. 40.)

The loan officer with whom the Nances dealt in

applying for their conventional mortgage loan (hereinafter
referred to as the "Residential Loan") was Paul Thurston, an
employee of Valley Mortgage, who was acting as agent for Valley
Bank in closing mortgage loans.

(T. 17, 18.) When the loan was

finally made, however, the lender was Valley Bank and the loan was
made using Valley Bank forms. (T. 44; plaintiff's exhibit 1.)
5.

Preparatory to the making of the Residential Loan

Valley Mortgage, acting as agent for Valley Bank, contacted
Mountain View Title, an agent of U.S. Life Title, and requested a
commitment for title insurance. (T. 23, 24.)
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6.

In response to Mr, Thurston's request, Mountain View

Title produced and delivered to him the requested Commitment for
Title Insurance ("the Commitment") showing the "proposed insured"
as "Valley Mortgage",

(Plaintiff's exhibit 2 (a copy of which is

attached to this Brief as Addendum 2).) The Commitment was
apparently prepared by Mountain View Title from an earlier
commitment prepared by another title insurer, Utah Title, as part
of the documentation of the SBA Loan,
7.

(T. 130, 155.)

The Commitment describes in its Schedule B-II a

number of matters which were to be excepted from coverage under
the policy of title insurance which was to follow.

Significantly,

the list of excepted matters did not include the SBA Trust Deed.
The reason for this omission was apparently that the earlier
commitment produced by Utah Title upon which the Mountain View
commitment was based had not listed the SBA Trust Deed as an
exception.
8.

The Residential Loan was closed on approximately

April 26, 1983.

The amount of the loan was $101,500.00.

Thereafter the Residential Loan trust deed ("the Residential Trust
Deed") was recorded on April 26, 1983, (Plaintiff's exhibit 1;
T, 4.)
9.

After the Residential Loan closed Mountain View

Title, acting as agent for U.S. Life Title, issued a "mortgagee
policy of title insurance" ("the Policy"). (Plaintiff's exhibit 3.)
(The Policy is attached to this Brief as Addendum 3.)
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Even though

Mountain View Title had discovered the SBA Trust Deed following
the issuance of the Commitment, the Policy did not show that prior
lien as a described exception to the coverage.

Mountain View

Title's failure to list the SBA Trust Deed as an exception in the
Policy was due to the fact that it believed that Valley Bank
intended to release the SBA Trust Deed. (T. 127-128.)
10.

Subsequent to the closing of the Residential Loan-

apparently for administrative convenience—Valley Bank assigned
the Residential Trust Deed to Valley Mortgage who, in turn, sold
the loan, and assigned the Trust Deed, to Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac").

(T. 37-39; plaintiff's

exhibits 4, 5.)
11.

On November 18, 1983, Intermountain Thrift & Loan, a

subsidiary of Valley Utah Bancorporation, loaned the Nances the
sum of $10,000.00 and took as collateral a trust deed on the same
property described in the SBA and Residential Trust Deeds, as well
as an adjacent lot owned by the Nances.

(T. 7; plaintiff's

exhibit 18.)
12.

During the period between March and June of 1984,

the Nances defaulted on the SBA, Residential, and Intermountain
Thrift loans.

(T. 80, 98.) As a consequence, Valley Bank,

Freddie Mac, and Intermountain Thrift, respectively, each filed
notices of default as part of the nonjudicial trust deed
foreclosure procedure provided by Utah law.
8, 19, 20; T. 54-55, 58-59.)
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(Plaintiff's exhibits

13.

No trustee's sale on the SBA and Residential Trust

Deeds was ever held.

(T. 85, 107.)

Instead, a trustee's sale was

conducted on or about April 4, 1985, pursuant to the foreclosure
of the Intermountain Thrift Trust Deed which was subordinate to
the liens of the SBA and Residential Trust Deeds.
exhibit 8A; T. 60.)

(Plaintiff's

(The trustee's deed is attached as

Addendum 4.)
14.

The successful bidder at the Intermountain Thrift

trustee's sale was Valley Bank who "credit bid" the sum of
$11,941.45. (T. 63, 74.)

By a Trustee's Deed dated April 4, 1985,

Valley Bank as trustee under the Intermountain Thrift Trust Deed
conveyed fee title to itself as the successful bidder at the
trustee's sale. (Plaintiff's exhibit 8A.)
15.

After it discovered the existence of the SBA Loan

Freddie Mac demanded that Valley Bank repurchase the Residential
Loan or that it remedy the Nances' default in the payment of their
monthly installments.

(T. 81; plaintiff's exhibit 10.)

In

response Valley Bank, through Valley Mortgage, brought all
payments current.

(T. 82.)

decided to pay off the loan.

Eventually, however, Valley Bank
Accordingly, in December of 1986,

Valley Bank paid Freddie Mac the sum of $103,912.78 in complete
satisfaction of its repurchase obligation. (T. 82.)

Although

Although Freddie Mac was paid with a Valley Mortgage check,
the latter merely acted as a servicing agent and received
reimbursement for the payment from Valley Bank. (T. 87.)
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Valley Bank paid Freddie Mac the payoff on the loan—apparently
pursuant to a recourse agreement—the loan was not assigned to
Valley Bank by Freddie Mac.

Instead, Freddie Mac requested that

the trustee under the Residential Trust Deed reconvey the Trust
Deed, thus releasing the lien.

(T. 95-96.) As of the date of the

trial, the deed of reconveyance had not yet been recorded.
16.

(Id.)

Subsequent to its discovery of the existence of the

SBA Trust Deed and while it still owned the Residential Loan
Freddie Mac made demand upon U.S. Life Title to defend Freddie
Mac's interest under its Trust Deed.

On November 22, 1985,

subsequent to Valley Bank's purchase of the property at the
Intermountain Thrift trustee's sale, U.S. Life Title denied
coverage under the Policy and refused Freddie Mac's tender of
defense.

(Plaintiff's exhibit 11.)
17.

As noted above the SBA Trust Deed was never

foreclosed upon.

At trial an employee of the SBA Department of

Valley Bank offered the following explanation for the Bank's
failure to pursue its foreclosure to completion:
Q.

[W]as there ever a foreclosure sale on the SBA
Loan? On the subject property?

A.

No.

Q.

Why not?

A.

Because our lien was superior to any of the
others that were being foreclosed upon.

Q.

But your lien was in default. Didn't you
customarily foreclose on loans in default?
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A.

Yes sir. We normally would.

Q.

Why didn't you in this case?

A.

Because it was, you know, another entity of
Valley Bank & Trust Company, on a sister
company so to speak, and in talking with SBA we
worked out an agreement with SBA to let them go
ahead and foreclose it and go through the
expense rather than have our department and SBA
sharing expenses.

Q.

So SBA, that is the SBA Department of Valley
Bank agreed not to foreclose on its loan, is
that correct?

A. Yes.
(T. 106-107.)

The SBA Trust Deed was subsequently released by a

deed of reconveyance dated December 23, 1986.

(Defendant's

exhibit 25.)
18.

Several months after its purchase of the insured

property, together with the adjacent lot, at the trustee's sale in
the Intermountain Thrift foreclosure, Valley Bank sold the
property to Gary and Shauna Weaver for $55,000.00.

Purchase of

the property was financed by Valley Bank who gave the Weavers a
warranty deed and took back a trust deed to secure payment of a
note in the sum of $40,000.00.

(T. 101- 102; plaintiff's exhibits

9, 21, 22.)
19.

The Policy contains the following "Exclusions From

Coverage":

3. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse
claims, or other matters (a) created, suffered,
assumed or agreed to by the insured claimant . .
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(Plaintiff's exhibit 3 (second page).)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
U.S. Life Title has endeavored to organize its arguments
to roughly correspond to those of Valley Bank as contained in its
Brief.

Accordingly, Points I.A., B., and C. address the issues

raised in Valley Bank's Arguments II.B, C, and D, respectively.
(U.S. Life Title does not dispute the general proposition proposed
in Valley Bank's Argument I that this court may review the trial
court's conclusions of law.)

Point II addresses the issues raised

in Valley Bank's Argument II.A and Point III sets forth U.S. Life
Title's response to Argument IV.
Inasmuch as the appellant's Argument III does not appear
to be based upon any particular legal theory—it merely asserts
the proposition that enforcement of the terms of the Policy would
not be fair to Valley Bank—no specific response has been
attempted. Rather, U.S. Life Title has dealt with the arguments
raised in Argument III in the context of its response to the other
Arguments.
Point IV of this Brief deals with the general question of
whether Valley Bank has met its burden of proving that the
existence of the SBA Trust Deed damaged Valley Bank.

The argument

contained in Point IV is based upon the evidence which shows that
the Residential Trust Deed was lost by merger of that trust deed
into the fee title acquired by Valley Bank subsequent to the
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foreclosure sale of the Intermountain Thrift Trust Deed.

The

evidence also shows that the SBA Trust Deed was never foreclosed,
that it was subsequently released, and that during the time it was
in existence the SBA lien did not prevent Valley Bank from
foreclosing on the Residential Trust Deed and would not have
interfered with any marketing of the property following
foreclosure.

Thus there was no loss to Valley Bank which was

covered by the Policy.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:
THE SBA TRUST DEED LIEN IS EXCLUDED FROM COVERAGE UNDER
THE POLICY BECAUSE VALLEY BANK "CREATED" THAT LIEN.
As noted above in the Statement of Facts, Valley Bank
caused the subject property to be encumbered with the lien of the
SBA Trust Deed on April 5, 1983.

Since the Policy specifically

excludes from coverage any "defects, liens, [or] encumbrances
. . . created ... by the insured claimant . . .", the court below
concluded that "the lien of the SBA Trust Deed is excluded from
coverage under the Policy by paragraph 3(a) of the Exclusions From
Coverage."

(R. 107; Addendum 1.)

Valley Bank disputes the trial

court's conclusion on three qrounds:

(1) in obtaining the SBA

Trust Deed Valley Bank did not intend to defraud the insurer.
(2) U.S. Life Title knew of the existence of the SBA Trust Deed.
(3) Valley Bank did not have knowledge of the existence of the SBA
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Trust Deed.

These arguments will be considered in subpoints A, B,

and C of this Point,
A,

VALLEY BANK CONSCIOUSLY AND DELIBERATELY CAUSED THE SBA TRUST
DEED TO COME INTO EXISTENCE.
Under the rubric "Exclusions From Coverage" the Policy

states:
The following matters are expressly excluded
from the coverage of this policy:
X .

2.
3.
claims, or
assumed or

. . .

...
Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse
other matters (a) created, suffered,
agreed to by the insured claimant . . .

Relying on the above language and on evidence that the SBA
Department of Valley Bank caused the SBA Trust Deed lien to be
placed on the subject property, the court below concluded that the
lien was excluded from coverage under the Policy because Valley
Bank had "created" a lien or encumbrance on the property.

In this

appeal Valley Bank argues that it did not "create" the SBA Trust
Deed lien because it did not deliberately act to create that
2
lien and because Valley Bank was not guilty of fraud or
3
misconduct.
For the reasons stated below those arguments are
untenable.

2

"A person cannot be deemed to have created a defect when
that person did not deliberately act to bring about the defect or
when the person had no knowledge of the existence of the defect."
(Brief of Appellant, p. 26.)
3Min the absence of fraud or misconduct on the part of
Valley Bank, the exclusion for defects created by the insured
should not apply." (Brief of Appellant, p. 17.)
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1.

Vallev Bank Created The Lien,
Valley Bank's argument that it did not

M

createM the SBA

Trust Deed lien appears to be based upon the following syllogism:
(major premise) the word -create" implies deliberate rather than
inadvertent causation; (minor premise) Valley Bank did not intend
to cause the existence of the SBA Trust Deed; (conclusion)
therefore Valley Bank did not "create" the Trust Deed,
As a general proposition the word "create" appears to
require only causation, not deliberate causation.

Thus BLACKS LAW

DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979) defines the word "create" as follows:
"To bring into being; to cause to exist; to produce; as, to create
a trust, to create a corporation."

Nevertheless courts which have

interpreted the word "created" as used in the standard title
insurance policy exclusion have required intentional causation.
Thus, in American Savings & Loan Association v. Lawyers Title Ins.
Corp., 793 F.2d 760, 784 (6th Cir. 1985), the court stated:
The term "created" has generally been
construed to require a conscious, deliberate and
sometimes affirmative act intended to bring about
the conflicting claim, in contrast to mere
inadvertence or negligence.
Accord, Hansen v. Western Title Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 531, 33
Cal. Rptr. 668, 671 (1963); Feldman v. Urban Commercial, Inc., 87
N.J. Super. 391, 404, 209 A.2d 640, 648 (App. Div. 1968).
The weakness of Valley Bank's reasoning lies in its minor
premise that it did not deliberately cause the SBA Trust Deed to
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exist.

Such an argument is particularly difficult to understand

when one considers that Valley Bank freely admits that "[t]he
Small Business Administration Department is a department of Valley
Bank" (Brief of Appellant, pp. 27-28) and "the SBA Department
created the SBA Trust Deed."

(Brief of Appellant, p. 29.)

If the

SBA Department is a department of Valley Bank and if that
department created the SBA Trust Deed, then under well-recognized
principles of agency it would follow that Valley Bank "created"
the SBA Trust Deed.

Thus it has been stated:

Any person who is sui juris and has capacity
to affect his legal relationships by the giving
of consent to a delegable act or transaction may
authorize an agent to act for him with the same
effect as if he were to act in person. The
principal may be either a natural person or an
artificial one.
3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 9, pp. 516-17 (1962).
The "quibble" in Zions* argument appears to lie in the
fact that the mortgage department of Valley Bank which made the
Residential Loan did not know of the existence of a loan made by
another department of the Bank, the SBA Department.

But as more

fully discussed in Point I.C., below, the knowledge of the agent
(the SBA Department) imparts knowledge to the principal, Valley
Bank. Thus Valley Bank knew of the existence of the SBA Trust Deed
when it closed the Residential Loan.
The real issue in this case is not whether the mortgage
department of Valley Bank knew of the existence of the SBA Trust
Deed, rather, it is whether the SBA Department—an agent of Valley
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Bank—consciously and deliberately intended to bring into
existence the SBA Trust Deed.

If it did not—if it created

that Trust Deed by inadvertence or mistake—then the lien is
unenforceable and could never have caused any diminution in the
value of the Residential Trust Deed.

On the other hand, if the

SBA Department truly did intend to place a trust deed lien on the
subject property, then, as the SBA Department's principal, Valley
Bank intentionally and deliberately caused that Trust Deed to come
into existence.

Indeed, Valley Bank does not seriously argue that

the SBA Trust Deed was created through inadvertence or mistake.
It merely asserts that the Mortgage Department did not know about
the loan.

Nevertheless, the evidence clearly demonstrates that

the SBA Department, and hence Valley Bank knew about and created
the SBA Trust Deed.
2.

The Policy Exclusion For Liens Created By The Insured
Does Not Require That The Insured Be Guilty Of Fraud Or
Misconduct.
Argument II.B. of the Brief of Appellant is devoted to

the proposition that more than deliberate causation is required to
exclude a lien or encumbrance ••created" by the insured under a
policy of title insurance.

Instead, says the Appellant, the

insurer must demonstrate that the insured has been guilty of fraud
or misconduct.

Thus Valley Bank states, M[T]he exclusion should

not be enforced in the absence of fraud or misconduct on the part
of the insured." (Brief of Appellant, p. 20.)
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Valley Bank's argument flies in the face of the
well-recognized rule that the word "created" requires only Ma
conscious, deliberate and sometimes affirmative act intended to
bring about the conflicting claim . . •"

American Savings & Loan

Association v. Lawyers Title Ins, Corp., supra, 793 F.2d at 784.
The argument appears to be based upon a misunderstanding of cases
which have attempted to interpret the standard exclusion for liens
"created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured claimant".
Unlike the present case, most such cases have involved
fact situations in which it was not clear whether there had been
deliberate causation of the prior lien or encumbrance by the
insured.

Thus, for example, in American Savings, supra, a case

discussed at some length in the Brief of Appellant, the court was
called upon to decide whether the insured lender's underfunding of
a construction project and the resulting creation of mechanics'
liens demonstrated that the lender had "suffered, assumed or
agreed to" the creation of the mechanics' liens.

Although the

court in dictum discussed the meaning of the word "created", it
specifically noted that counsel for the title insurance company
had "conceded that American ha[d] not created or agreed to the
mechanics' liens within the meaning of the policy."
n.l.

id. at 784

Reversing a magistrate's decision the Court of Appeals found

that the mere underfunding of the project did not show that the
insured lender had assumed or agreed to the creation of the
mechanics' liens.
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By contrast in Brown v. St. Paul Title Ins. Corp., 634
F.2d 1103 (8th Cir. 1980) and in Banker's Trust Co. v.
Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 231 (10th Cir. 1979), the
courts found that the failure of insured lenders to disburse
committed funds, thereby causing unpaid materialmen and suppliers
to file mechanics* liens, demonstrated that the insured had
created or suffered the existence of those encumbrances.
It should be noted that in none of those cases, and,
indeed, in none of the cases cited by Valley Bank in its Brief,
did the court find that a prior encumbrance consciously and
deliberately created by the insured was outside of the
exclusionary language of the policy.

For example, in American

Savings the court found that the lender neither intended to create
mechanics' liens nor caused (suffered) them to be created.
Similarly, in Hansen v. Western Title Ins. Co., 220 Cal.App.2d
531, 33 Cal.Rptr. 668 (1963) (discussed at pp. 23-24 of Brief of
Appellant) the court held that execution by the insured of an
ambiguous document which created a cloud on the title did not fall
within the exclusionary language of the policy because the signing
of the document did not involve "conscious, deliberate causation"
of the defect.

220 Cal. App. 2d at 535.

Thus in Hansen there was

neither intentional causation nor misconduct by the insured.
By contrast, all of the other cases relied upon by
Appellant deal with insureds to whom coverage was denied because
of their fraud or misconduct.

Significantly, Valley Bank is
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unable to direct the court's attention to a single instance where
a court has held that the exclusion in question would not apply
because the insured's creation of an encumbrance was innocent,
albeit deliberate.
Illustrative of the principle that the word "created"
requires only deliberate causation, not fraud or misconduct, is
the case of Safeco Title Ins. Co. v. Moskopoulos, 172 Cal.Rptr.
248, 116 Cal.App. 3d 658, 18 A.L.R.4th 1301 (1981).

There the

insured, Moskopoulos, had been sued by an earlier owner of the
subject property seeking rescission or imposition of a
constructive trust based upon the alleged improper clouding of the
previous owner's title by Moskopoulos.

He tendered defense of the

claim to his title insurer, Safeco, who denied coverage.

In

upholding the decision of the trial court which found against
Moskopoulos the appellate court held that the alleged defect was
not in existence on the date that the policy was issued.

In

addition, in dictum, the court stated that under policy language
identical to that under consideration in this case coverage of the
defect arising from the action filed by the prior owner was, in
reality, "created by the insured."

The court stated:

In the instant case the interpretation [of
the evidence] most favorable to appellant is
"conscious, deliberate causation on the part of
appellant. Appellant testified, and the trial
court found, that appellant's conduct throughout
the entire transaction was intentional and
deliberate and not inadvertent or mistaken.
Accordingly, the exclusionary provisions are
applicable for the reason that appellant
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"created" the "adverse claim" against which he
seeks to have Safeco defend him. Since the
exclusion applies, there is no duty to defend."
18 A.L.R.4th at 1309 (emphasis added).
It is significant to note that the court in Safeco Title
did not emphasize any misconduct on the part of the insured, even
though there appeared to have been such, but rather based its
conclusion on the fact that the actions of the insured constituted
"conscious, deliberate causation."

The obvious inference is that

the court believed that application of the "created" exclusion
requires a showing of "intentional and deliberate" causation, not
the mere absence of fraud or misconduct.
Since in this case it is clear that Valley Bank's SBA
Department intended to "create" the SBA Trust Deed, that lien was
excluded from Policy coverage.
B.

U.S. LIFE TITLE'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE SBA TRUST
DEED IS IRRELEVANT TO A DETERMINATION OF WHETHER VALLEY BANK
"CREATED" THAT LIEN.
In Argument II.C. of its Brief, Appellant suggests the

novel theory that the "created" exclusion found in paragraph 3(a)
of the Policy is only applicable if the insurer has no knowledge
4
of the title defect.
As authority for this proposition

4

The heading to Appellant's Argument II.C. states, "Because
U.S. Title knew about the SBA Trust Deed, Valley Bank should not
be deemed to have created the SBA Trust Deed within the meaning of
the exclusion."
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Valley Bank cites the cases of Hansen v. Western Title Ins. Co.,
supra, and Ginger v. American Title Ins. Co., 29 Mich. App. 279,
185 N.W. 2d 54 (1970).

A close reading of those cases reveals,

however, that Valley Bank's reliance on them is misplaced.
As noted above, in Hansen the defect in the title which
the insured was supposed to have "created" consisted of an
ambiguity in a recorded document signed by the insured and drafted
by the insured's attorney.

In response to the insurer's

contention that the title defect had been "created" by the insured
within the meaning of the policy exclusion the court recited the
rule that the word "created" implies "an intentional doing by the
insured".

220 Cal.App.2d at 536. The court went on to suggest,

however, that even where the lien had been created by
inadvertence, the exclusion might still apply if the insurer had
no notice of the defect, but the insured did.

It said:

Although we would be inclined to make an
outright restriction of the word "created," as
used in the policy, to an intentional doing by
the insured, nevertheless, because of our
unwillingness to decide more than we must in a
case so lacking in precedent, we limit our ruling
to a case in which the insured did not
intentionally produce the claim and in which the
insurer itself had opportunity to know the
defect. It is conceivable that a case could
arise where the insured's inadvertence or mistake
would produce a defect which would be outside the
power of the insurer reasonably to find; but such
a case is far removed from this.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Thus, far from standing for the proposition that the
exclusionary language is inapplicable where the insurer was aware
of the defect, Hansen suggests a possible exception to the general
rule requiring an intentional act by the insured, if the title
insurer could not reasonably have known of the defect.
By contrast, Ginger v. American Title involved not only
interpretation of the "created" exclusion, but also a second
standard exclusion as to defects, liens, and encumbrances "known
to the insured • . . and not shown by the public records, unless
disclosure thereof in writing by the insured shall have been made
5
to the company [insurer] . . . "
As to the applicability of the
two exclusions the court stated:
The defect in this case was the fraudulent
character of the purported conveyance. Such
defect was known to plaintiff but not disclosed
to his insurer. We hold that this defect was
expressly excluded from coverage in the policy
under . . . [both clauses].
I£. at 56.
Although the court in Ginger did not further describe the
facts which gave rise to application of each exclusion, the
logical inference is that the insured's failure to disclose the
fraudulent conveyance to the title insurer was relevant only to
the applicability of the second exclusion (which is identical to

^An identical provision appears in the Policy as Exclusion
3(b).
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paragraph 3(b) of the Policy), since it specifically requires that
the insured give notice of defects to the title insurer.
Furthermore, the language of the Policy gives no support
to the notion that a lien is not "created" by the insured if the
title insurer knows of its creation.

Indeed, since Exclusion 3(a)

makes no mention of notice to the insurer, while Exclusion 3(b)
specifically requires that such notice be given, the clear
implication is that knowledge or notice is not a prerequisite to
the application of subparagraph (a). This fact, coupled with the
absence of any authority which supports Valley Bank's theory, must
lead to the rejection of that theory.
C.

VALLEY BANK KNEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE SBA TRUST DEED.
In Argument II.D. of its Brief Valley Bank suggests that

the exclusion of paragraph 3(a) is inapplicable because "Valley
Bank did not have knowledge of the SBA Trust Deed". (Brief of
Appellant, p. 25.) As discussed in Point I.A.I, of this Brief,
the argument erroneously focuses upon Valley Bank's knowledge,
rather than its intent.

Nonetheless, since knowledge and intent

are closely related, it may be useful to examine the evidence and
applicable legal principles which demonstrate that Valley Bank did
in fact have knowledge of the existence of the SBA Trust Deed.
At the outset it must be conceded that although there was
a dispute in the evidence on the issue, the trial court found that
the loan officer for Valley Bank who made the Residential Loan,
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Paul Thurston, did not know of the existence of the SBA Trust
Deed.

(See Finding 5., R. 105.)

If, therefore, knowledge of

the existence of the SBA Trust Deed could only be imparted to
Valley Bank through Mr. Thurston, one would have to concede that
Valley Bank did not have knowledge of the encumbrance.
The flaw in Valley Bank's reasoning lies in the fact that
the Bank had other agents who had knowledge of the existence of
the SBA Trust Deed, namely, the employees of its SBA Department.
Indeed, Appellant freely admits that Mthe SBA Department created
the SBA Trust Deed." (Brief of Appellant, p. 29.)

The significance

of this fact is, of course, that an agent of Valley Bank—the SBA
Department—knew of the existence of the SBA Trust Deed because it
took that Trust Deed as collateral for a loan which it made to the
Nances.

Accordingly, Valley Bank, as principal, had knowledge by

virtue of the knowledge of its agent.

This principle was long ago

recognized by this court:
Ordinarily notice to an agent touching the
subject-matter of his agency or in regard to the
transaction in which he is engaged is notice to
his principal.
B.T. Moran, Inc. v. First Security Corporation, 82 Utah 316, 24
P.2d 384, 387 (1933).

See also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY,

§ 272 (1958).

6

"The officer of plaintiff who closed the Residential Loan,
Paul Thurston, was unaware at the time of closing of the existence
of the SBA loan."
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From the foregoing it is clear that even if paragraph
3(a) of the Exclusions requires knowledge of the defect by Valley
Bank, the Bank did, in fact, have such knowledge by virtue of the
knowledge of the existence of the SBA Trust Deed by the employees
of Valley Bank's SBA Department.
POINT II:
U.S. LIFE TITLE HAD NO DUTY TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THE
SBA TRUST DEED ON THE POLICY OR THE COMMITMENT.
Valley Bank argues in Argument II.A. of its Brief that
the Policy contains an implied warranty of title, which U.S. Life
Title breached by failing to list the SBA Trust Deed as an
exception on Schedule B.

For the reasons set forth in subpoints A

and B below, Valley Bank's argument must be rejected.

In any

case, as discussed in Point IV below, Valley Bank has suffered no
loss as a result of the omission of the SBA Trust Deed from the
list of exceptions contained in the Policy.
A.

U.S. LIFE TITLE HAD NO DUTY UNDER THE POLICY TO LIST
THE SBA TRUST DEED.
Valley Bank contends that, as a general principle, title

insurers have a duty to their insureds to list all encumbrances on
the insured property.

Valley Bank's argument is based upon a

misunderstanding of this court's decision in the case of Bush v.
Coult, 594 P.2d 865 (Utah 1979), in which the court noted that
"the policy of title insurance is in the nature of a warranty"
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{quoting Research Loan & Investment Corp, v. Lawyers Title Ins.
Corp,, 361 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1966)) (emphasis added).

In Bush v.

Coult the court had to determine whether an insured had the
obligation to investigate the accuracy of certain information
indicating a possible cloud on title and to disclose that
information to the insurer.

This court held that "the law imposes

no duty upon one who seeks title insurance to perform the
responsibilities of the insurer to ascertain the state of title."
l£l. at 867.

The court supported that conclusion by pointing out

that it is the title insurer's duty, not the insured's, to
research the status of the title.

The court did not say, however,

that the policy itself contained implied covenants against
encumbrances.

Such a view would, in effect, impose upon a title

insurer the duties of an abstracting company.
This precise issue was raised in the case of Houston
Title Co. v. Oieda De Toca, 733 S.W. 2d 325 (Tex. App.—Houston
1987) where the court stated:
The duties owed by a title insurance company
to its insured have been well documented and are
more easily understood in terms of the
relationship between the two. The title
insurance company is not, as is an abstract
company, employed to examine title; rather, the
title insurance company is employed to guarantee

the status

of title and to insure

against

existing defects. Thus, the relationship between
the parties is limited to that of indemnitor and
indemnitee.
Id. at 327.
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Similarly in Lawrence v. Chicago Title Ins. Co.,
Rptr. 264 (Cal.App. 1987) the court stated:
The insurer does not represent expressly or
impliedly that the title is as set forth in the
policy; it merely agrees that, and the insured
only expects that, the insurer will pay for any
losses resulting from, or he will cause the
removal of, a cloud on the insured's title within
the policy provisions. . . . A title policy is
not a summary of the public records and the
insurer is not supplying information; to the
contrary he is giving a contract of indemnity.
The title insurer, as any other insurer, can and
does assume the risk of its policy. Every
insurer can and does contract to indemnify
against specific risks . . . Accordingly, when
the contingency insured against under the policy
occurs, the title insurer is not, by that fact
alone, liable to the insured for damages in
contract or tort, but rather is obligated to
indemnify the insured under the terms of the
policy.
Id. at 267 (emphasis in original text).
The language of the Policy itself supports the
interpretation of title insurance policies offered by thes
courts.

The front page of the policy states:
Subject to the Exclusions From Coverage, the
exceptions contained in Schedule B and the
provisions of the Conditions and Stipulations
hereof, U.S. Life Title Insurance Company of
Dallas . . . insures, as of the Date of Policy
shown in Schedule A, against loss or damage, not
exceeding the amount of insurance stated in
Schedule A, and the costs, attorney's fees and
expenses which the Company may become obligated
to pay hereunder, sustained or incurred by the
insured by reason of:

2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on such
title.
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(Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 3, first page.)

Thus, the Policy is a

contract to indemnify Valley Bank for any loss suffered as a
result of any encumbrances not excluded or excepted from the
Policy.

The Policy is not a warranty that no other encumbrances

exist, and by its very terms the Policy does not cover a loss
arising from U.S. Life Title's failure to list such an
encumbrance.

It follows that Valley Bank may only recover damages

from U.S. Life Title if the SBA Trust Deed falls within the
coverage of the Policy.

Since, as demonstrated in Point I, above,

the SBA Trust Deed is excluded from coverage, Valley Bank is
without a remedy.
B.

EVEN IF THE POLICY IMPOSES THE DUTIES OF AN ABSTRACTOR
ON U.S. LIFE TITLE, ENCUMBRANCES CREATED BY VALLEY BANK
NEED NOT BE REPORTED.
If, as Valley Bank contends, the Policy imposes on U.S.

Life Title an implied duty to disclose encumbrances on the insured
property, that duty is nonetheless circumscribed by the written
provisions of the Policy.

Thus, if one assumes that coverage

under the Policy includes the duty to disclose encumbrances, it
must also be true that the Policy's "Exclusions From Coverage" are
applicable.

That conclusion is consistent with the language of

paragraph 3 of the "Conditions and Stipulations" of the Commitment
which states:
In no event shall such liability [i.e., the
liability of the insurer under the Commitment]
exceed the amount stated in Schedule A for the
policy or policies committed for and such
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liability is subject to the insuring provisions,
the Conditions and Stipulations, and the
Exclusions From Coverage of the form of policy or
policies committed for in favor of the proposed
insured which are incorporated by reference and
are made a part of this Commitment except as
expressly modified herein.
(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 2 last page.) (Emphasis added.)
Thus, we come full circle: whether Valley Bank's theory
is based upon the written provisions of the Policy or upon implied
duties, the Bank must still show that it did not consciously or
deliberately create the SBA Trust Deed.

Since, as demonstrated in

Point I, above, it cannot meet that burden, the Bank's argument
must be rejected.
POINT III;
U.S. LIFE TITLE IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM RELYING UPON THE
EXCLUSIONS OF THE POLICY.
As discussed in Argument IV of its Brief, Valley Bank
contends that application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel
would prohibit U.S. Life Title from raising paragraph 3(a) of the
Exclusions as a defense to this action.

While it is tempting to

debate whether the facts of the case support the Bank's assertion,
in reality such a discussion is unnecessary because Valley Bank's
knowledge of the existence of the SBA Trust Deed and its failure
to plead or argue the estoppel issue at trial preclude the Bank
from raising the issue before this court.

Those two grounds will

be discussed separately in the subpoints which follow.
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A.

THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS INAPPLICABLE BECAUSE
VALLEY BANK KNEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE SBA TRUST DEED.
As has been demonstrated in Point I.e., supra, Valley

Bank knew of the existence of the SBA Trust Deed from its
inception because that lien was obtained from the Nances as
collateral for the SBA Loan.

It is well recognized that such

knowledge disqualifies the possessor from asserting the doctrine
of equitable estoppel against another.
Waiver § 95 (1966).

28 Am Jur 2d Estoppel and

Thus, this court has stated:

The doctrine of equitable estoppel does not
operate in favor of one who has knowledge of the
essential facts or who has convenient and
available means of obtaining such knowledge.
Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 n.4 (Utah 1976).
Inasmuch as Valley Bank had knowledge of the existence of
the SBA Trust Deed, it follows that it may not seek application of
the doctrine of equitable estoppel against U.S. Life Title.
B.

VALLEY BANK MAY NOT ASSERT THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL BECAUSE IT FAILED TO RAISE THE ISSUE BELOW.
This court adheres to the well-recognized view that:
[W]here a party neither raises an issue in
its pleadings nor presents it to the trial court,
the issue cannot be considered for the first time
on appeal.

Park City Utah Corp. v. Ensign Co., 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978);
Hanover Limited v. Fields, 568 P.2d 751, 753 (Utah 1977).
This principle applies to Valley Bank's theory of
equitable estopel.

Unless estoppel is pleaded or a claim
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regarding estoppel is made before the trial court, an appellate
court may not consider that theory,

Currie v. Great Central

Insurance Co., 374 So.2d 1330, 1333 (Ala. 1979); Peterson v.
Moulton, 144 A.2d 717, 720 (Vt. 1958); Vallev Loan Service v.
Neal, 235 P.2d 932, 935 (Okla. 1951).
In this case, neither Valley Bank's Complaint (R. 2) nor
its unsuccessful Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum
(R. 31, 33) make any mention of equitable estoppel or of any
reliance upon representations by U.S. Life Title.

Correspond-

ingly, the opening statement at trial of Valley Bank's attorney,
Mr. Haslam, contains no mention of the words "equitable estoppel"
or "estoppel".

It is therefore clear that Valley Bank's theory of

equitable estoppel was neither raised in the pleadings nor
presented at trial.

For that reason, the Bank may not now raise

this issue for the first time before this court.
POINT IV:
VALLEY BANK HAS SUFFERED NO INJURY AS A RESULT OF THE
EXISTENCE OF THE SBA TRUST DEED.
Paragraph 6 of the Policy ("Determination and Payment of
Loss") provides that the liability of U.S. Life Title is the
lesser of (i) "the actual loss of the insured claimant"; or
(ii) "the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A . . ."; or
(iii) "the amount of the indebtedness secured by the insured
mortgage . . . at the time the loss or damage insured against

-29-

. • • occurs • . • ".

The issue raised by the evidence in this

case is whether any loss attributable to the existence of the SBA
Loan ever occurred.

Relevant to that issue, the evidence adduced

at trial was that the SBA Trust Deed was never foreclosed, that
Valley Bank had decided not to foreclose the Trust Deed, and that
subsequent to the discovery of the SBA Loan by the mortgage
department of the Bank the Trust Deed was released.
An insured is not entitled to recover damages from the
title insurer for all losses which he may suffer, but rather only
for those losses directly attributable to the failure of title.
Thus, it has been stated:
[Wjhile the contract of insurance was
breached at the time the policy was delivered and
the title company became immediately liable to
the insured, it was only liable for the loss that
the mortgagee actually suffered and for such loss
as was due to failure of title.
Narberth Building & Loan Association v. Bryn Mawr Trust Co., 12 6
Pa. Super. 74, 190 A. 149, 151 (1937).
There is no clear evidence that any loss which Valley
Bank may have suffered was due to a failure of title.

Indeed, the

Bank appears to have treated the SBA Loan, the Residential Loan
and the Intermountain Thrift Loan as a single transaction.

Thus,

for example, in explaining why the Bank had never foreclosed on
the SBA Loan a bank officer testified that the SBA Department did
not want to foreclose sale on "a sister company".

(T. 107.)

Furthermore, at the time of the foreclosure on the Intermountain
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Thrift Trust Deed Valley Bank, the holder of two superior liens,
"credit bid" and took title to the property.

Thereafter, Valley

Bank sold the property and the proceeds of sale were applied
against the SBA Loan.

Subsequently, the SBA Trust Deed was

released and the balance of the loan charged off.

(T. 105.)

Thus, at best, the evidence is unclear as to whether the SBA Trust
Deed in any way reduced the value of the insured mortgage:

the

Residential Trust Deed.
In most instances an insured's loss arising from an
undiscovered prior encumbrance is measured by the amount which he
must pay in order to cure the defect.

Thus, it has been said,

"the kind of loss contemplated by such a policy is that loss or
damage sustained when, 'because of a defect in the title,the
insured was bound to pay something to make it good'".

Grunberger

v. Iseson, 75 A.D. 2d 329, 429, N.Y.S. 2d 209, 211 (1980) (quoting
Empire Development Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 225 N.Y.
53, 121 N.E. 468).
An enumeration of the ways in which an insured may be
required to "make it good" is suggested by COUCH ON INSURANCE as
follows:
A mortgagee has been held entitled to
recover, within the limit of his policy, the
amount of a prior lien which was not disclosed by
the policy where—
— h e has discharged such lien.
— h e foreclosed his mortgage and bought the
property subject to such lien.
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— t h e existence of such lien was not discovered
until after he had foreclosed his mortgage and
bought the property.
15A COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 57:191 (19 83).
In this case it is clear that Valley Bank has not been
required to pay anything "to make it good":

(1) it has not been

required to pay off another lien holder for the discharge of its
lien; (2) it has not foreclosed the Residential Trust Deed and
bought the property subject to the SBA Lien; and (3) it did not
discover the existence of the SBA Trust Deed subsequent to
foreclosure.

In short, Valley Bank has suffered no diminution in

the value of the Residential Trust Deed as result of the existence
of the SBA Trust Deed.

On the contrary, Valley Bank lost its

trust deed lien by merger of the Trust Deed into the fee title
estate which the Bank purchased at the Intermountain Thrift
foreclosure sale.
This court has described the doctrine of merger as
follows:
Ordinarily when one having a mortgage on
real estate becomes the owner of the fee the
former estate is merged in the latter, but if it
was the intention to keep the mortgage alive, or,
if it is to the interest of the mortgagee, and it
can be done without prejudice to the rights of
the mortgagor or third persons, the doctrine of
merger, as between them will not apply . . . .
Where such intention is not expressed, the court
must endeavor to ascertain it by the
circumstances connected with the transaction or
must indulge in some presumption by which prima
facie its existence may be determined.
O'Reilly v. McLean, 84 Utah 551, 37 P.2d 770, 773 (1934).
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In this case the evidence showed that Valley Bank
purchased the fee title to the subject property on April 4, 1985,
as part of the foreclosure of the Intermountain Thrift Trust
Deed.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 8A—attached as Addendum 4.)

Valley

Bank's subsequent actions make it clear that it intended to merge
the SBA and the Residential Trust Deeds into the fee title estate
it acquired through the Intermountain Thrift foreclosure:
— I t terminated the pending foreclosure
proceedings for both the SBA Trust Deed and the
Residential Trust Deed.
— I t subsequently released both the SBA and the
Residential Trust Deeds.
— I t conveyed the property to the Weavers by a
warranty deed. By its use of a warranty deed
Valley Bank warranted to the Weavers that there
were no encumbrances on the property. Section
57-1-12 Utah Code Ann. (1953) (1986 Replacement).
Since the evidence clearly establishes that the
Residential Trust Deed was extinguished by merger in April of
1985, it is obvious that the loss of value of the Residential
Trust Deed was not caused by the existence of the SBA Trust Deed.
Under circumstances similar to those in this case, the
court in Grunberger v. Iseson, supra, found that the loss to an
insured was not compensable by the title insurer.

In that case,

the insured obtained coverage for its fourth priority mortgage.
Through inadvertence the insurer insured over a third mortgage.
When the owner of the property subsequently defaulted in his
obligations under the fourth mortgage the insured undertook
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judicial foreclosure proceedings.

Upon discovering the adverse

claim of the third mortgage holder, the insured then commenced a
declaratory judgment action for the purpose of determining the
priority of liens and the liability of the title insurer.

Before

judgment could be entered the holder of the second mortgage
conducted a foreclosure sale which resulted in a deficiency and an
extinguishment of the third and fourth mortgages.

Thereafter, the

title insurer moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
insured had suffered no loss as a result of the existence of the
third mortgage.

The trial court held for the title insurer and

the appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision holding
that "there was no damage to plaintiff within the terms of the
policy."

429 N.Y.S.2d at 211.
The same result is mandated in this case.

The

extinguishment of the Residential Trust Deed was not caused by the
existence or the foreclosure of the SBA Trust Deed; rather, its
loss was a product of the merger of the Residential Trust Deed
into the fee title estate acquired by Valley Bank.

For that

reason, Valley Bank has suffered no loss that requires
compensation under the Policy.
CONCLUSION
The parties in this case are parties to a contract.

That

contract requires that U.S. Life Title indemnify Valley Bank for
any loss incurred by the Bank as a result of title defects not
excluded from coverage.

The trial court correctly ruled that the
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SBA Trust Deed fell within the exclusion for liens "created" by
Valley Bank.

The language of the Policy is clear and unequivocal.

It is understandable that Valley Bank wishes to escape from the
clear exclusionary language of the Policy.

However:

Neither of the parties, nor the court has
any right to ignore or modify conditions which
are clearly expressed merely because it may
subject one of the parties to hardship, but they
must be enforced in accordance with the intention
as manifested by the language used by the parties
to the contract.
Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 321 P.2d 221, 223
(1958) .
The lower court recognized that the exclusionary language
of the policy was clear and unequivocal.

This court should affirm

that decision.
DATED this

day of March, 1988.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Steven H. Gunn
Attorneys for Respondent
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Respondent U.S. Life Title Insurance Company of Dallas to be
hand-delivered to the following:
Roy G. Haslam and
Elizabeth S. Whitney
BIELE HASLAM & HATCH
Attorneys for Appellant
50 West Broadway
4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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STEVEN H. GUNN (A1272) of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Defendant
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT IAKE OOUNIY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo—
VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,

:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LftW

:

Civil No. C-86-2379

Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY
OF DALLAS, a Texas corporation,
Defendant.

: (Judge Wilkinson)
:

—oooOooo—
The trial in the above case cane on for hearing on the 14th day of
May, 1987, before the Honorable Hcmer F. Wilkinson, District Court Judge.
Appearing on behalf of the plaintiff was Roy G. Haslam of the law firm of
Biele, Haslam & Hatch. Appearing on behalf of the defendant was Steven H.
Gunn of the law firm of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker.

Having received various

documents into evidence ancl having heard the testimony of witnesses and the
arguments of counsel, the Court now enters the following

ADDENDUM wn

l

FINDINSS OF FACTS:

1.

P l a i n t i f f brings t h i s action seeking damages under a certain

Mortgagee Policy of T i t l e Insurance (the "Policy") ( P l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibit 3 ) .
Under the Policy p l a i n t i f f i s l i s t e d as the "named insured".

By endorse-

ment the Federal Heme Loan Mortgage Corporation ("FHIMC") was also added as
an insured.
2.

The Policy was issued for the purpose of insuring p l a i n t i f f ' s

trust deed l i e n on certain real property (the "subject property")
in Suirmit County, Utah.

located

The trust deed insured under the Policy secured

payment of a loan by p l a i n t i f f t o F. Kent Nance and P a t r i c i a J . Nance in
the sum of $ 1 0 1 r 5 0 0 . 0 0 .

(Hereinafter the loan secured by the trust deed

covered under the Policy shall be referred to as the "residential loan" and
the t r u s t deed shall be referred to as the "residential trust deed".)

The

residential trust deed was executed April 25, 1983, and was recorded April2
6 , 1983.

Subsequent t o the c l o s i n g of the loan, p l a i n t i f f assigned the

loan to FHLMC.
3.

The residential loan was closed April 26, 1983, and the t i t l e

policy was i s s u e d some time subsequent t o July 2 2 , 1983.

Neither the

P o l i c y nor the Commitment which preceded i t specifically identified and
excluded the SBA trust deed from insurance coverage.
4.

Previous t o the time of the closing of the residential loan

p l a i n t i f f ' s SBA loan department had loaned the Nances the sum of $65,000.00
and had taken as s e c u r i t y for t h a t loan a t r u s t deed on the subject
property.

(Hereinafter the said e a r l i e r loan made by p l a i n t i f f s h a l l be

-2-

referred to as the "SBA loan" and the trust deed which secured its payments
will be referred to as the "SBA trust deed.) The date of execution of the
SBA trust deed was April l f 1983. It was recorded on April 5, 1983.
5. The officer of plaintiff who closed the residential loan, Paul
Thurston, was unaware at the time of closing of the existence of the SBA
loan.
6.

At the time the title policy was issued by defendant insuring

the residential loan, its agent, Mountain View Title, was aware that the
prior SBA trust deed was of record and failed to oannunicate such knowledge
to the plaintiff prior to issuing the Policy*
7.

Paragraph 3(a) ("Exclusions from Coverage") of the Policy

provides:
The following matters are expressly excluded fran coverage
of this Policy:
...

3. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims, or other
matters (a) created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the
insured claimant . . .
8.

In November, 1983, the Nances borrowed the sum of $10,000.00

fran Intermountain Thrift & Loan ("Intermountain Thrift") and gave as
security a trust deed on the subject property and on an adjacent unimproved
lot owned by the Nances.
9.

In early 1984, the Nances defaulted in making payments on the

SBA and residential loans. They also defaulted on the Intermountain Thrift
loan. As a consequence, Intermountain Ttirift filed a notice of default and
thereafter sold the subject property and the adjacent lot by trustee1 s sale

-3-

on April 4, 1985,

Plaintiff was the successful bidder at the sale and

received a Trustee's Deed (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8A) vrtiich recited a purchase
price in the sum of $11,941.45.
10.

At no time has plaintiff or FHLMC ever foreclosed judicially

or nonjudicially on the subject property.
11.

On or about November 21,1986, plaintiff sold the subject

property to Gary T. Weaver and Shauna L. Weaver ("the Weavers") and
delivered to them a warranty deed (Plaintiff's Exhibit 21).
12.

The purchase price paid by the Weavers to plaintiff upon sale

of the subject property was $55,000.00. The net proceeds which plaintiff
received from the sale was $51,857.17. The proceeds of sale were applied
by plaintiff against the amount owed on the SBA loan.
13.

On or about December 23, 1986, plaintiff released its SBA

trust deed lien on the subject property by a Full Reconveyance (Defendant's
Exhibit 25).
14.

On or about December 11, 1986, plaintiff paid FHLMC the full

amount owed under the residential loan. An officer of plaintiff testified
at trial that the residential trust deed lien would be released by reconveyance as soon as practical following the trial.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF U W
A.

The act of plaintiff in obtaining from the Nances a trust deed

lien on the subject property to secure payment of the SBA loan "'created a

-4-

lien or encumbrance" within the meaning of the Policy.
B. The lien of the SBA trust deed is excluded from coverage under
the Policy by paragraph 3(a) of the Exclusions from Coverage.
C. Defendant is not liable under the Policy for losses incurred
by Plaintiff as a result of the existence of the SBA trust deed.
D. Plaintiff1 s complaint should be dismissed with prejudice and
upon the merits.
E. Because the SBA trust deed is excluded from coverage under the
Policyr it is unnecessary for the Court to determine what loss plaintiff
incurred as the result of the existence of the said trust deed or to
determine whether plaintiff breadied the Policy as alleged by Defendant in
its Supplemental Ansvrer.

-5-
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Commitment
for Title Insurance

4

SL

USLIFE Title Insurance Company of Dallas, Dallas, Texas, A Texas Corporation, herein called the Company,
for valuable consideration, hereby commits to issue its policy or policies of title insurance, as identified in Schedule A, in favor of the proposed Insured named in Schedule A, as owner or mortgagee of the estate or interest
covered hereby in the land described or referred to in Schedule A. upon payment of the premiums and charges
therefor; all subject to the provisions of Schedules A and B and to the Conditions and Stipulations hereof.
This Commitment shall be effective only when the identity of the proposed Insured and the amount of the
policy or policies committed for have been inserted in Schedule A hereof by the Company, either at the
time of issuance of this Commitment or by subsequent endorsement.
This Commitment is preliminary to the issuance of such policy or policies of title insurance and all liability
and obligations hereunder shall cease and terminate six (6) months after the effective date hereof or when
the policy or policies committed for shall issue, whichever first occurs, provided that the failure to issue such
policy or policies is not the fault of the Company. The Commitment shall not be valid or binding until
countersigned by an authorized officer or agent.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, USLIFE Title Insurance Company of Dallas has caused this Commitment to be signed
and sealed as of the effective date of Commitment shown in Schedule A.

USLIFE TITLE INSURANCE Company of Dallas

tfU/M^
President 6 Chief Executive Officer

46*S/tc*6u/#&-£~
Attest Se/ior Vice-President. Secretery end General Counsel

L

*

^CIJK~^-'<:-L

Authorized Countersignature
r—>~—~—*v^~"*—v " • ^ ^

f; MOUNTAIN VIEW T I T I I T C i
1117 East Country HMa Dr.

Ogden, Utah S4403
(§01) 47*1170-1171-1172
(•01) 544-4245

ADDENDUM NO- 2
AMERICAN LAND TITLE ASSOCIATION coPvmftMT w * / o * v i

C

J <
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Prepared for:

VALLEY MORTGAGE

Attn: Paul Thurston
SCHEDULE A

GFNo.

inquiries should be directed
to Kevin Parkinson

D 2643

1. Effective date:

A p r i l 1 5 , 1983 § 8:00 a.m.

2. Policy or Policies to be issued:
(a) •

ALTA Owners Policy —

Amount
Form

—1970

$

Coverage —1970

i

Proposed Insured:
(b) £) ALTA Standard Loan Policy,
Proposed Insured:

1Q1

' 50° *00
(435.00)

VALLEY MORTGAGE

3. The estate or interest in the land described or referred to in this Commitment and covered herein is:

Fee Sinple

4. Title to said estate or interest in said land is at the effective date hereof vested in:

F. KENT NANCE and PATRICIA J. NANCE, his wife, as joint tenants.

5. The land referred to in this Commitment is located in the County of
State of
Utah
smd described as follows:

Summit

BEGINNING 173.55 feet North and 1466.1 feet East of the Quarter Section Corner
on the West line of Section 17, Ttawnship 3 South, Range 7 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, and running thence North 185.97 feet, more or less, to the South
boundary line of State Road right-of-way; thence along said boundary South 69°
59' East 106.4 feet; thence South 148.78 feet; thence West 100 feet to the
place of beginning.
ALSO BEING KNOWN and designated as Lot 3 of KAMP KILL KARE LOTS, according to
the official plat thereof on file in the office of the County Recorder of
Summit County.
TOGETHER WITH a right-of-way 20 feet wide being 10 feet on either side of the
following described center line, being on a point on the South Quarter boundary
line of State Road right-of-way 632 feet North and 856.1 feet East of the
quarter section corner on West line of said Section 17; thence'South 468.5
feet East 1080 feet; thence North 40 feet, more or less, to the State Road
right-of-way.

SCHEDULE B-ll

Schedule B of the policy or policies to be issued will contain exceptions to the following matters unless the
same are disposed of to the satisfaction of the Company:
1. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters, if any, created, first appearing in the
public records or attaching subsequent to the effective date hereof but prior to the date the proposed Insured acquires for value of record the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by
this Commitment.
2. Rights or claims of parties in possession not shown by the public records.
3. Any discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, overlapping of improvements, or other boundary or location disputes.
4. Any roadway or easement, similar or dissimilar, on, under, over, or across said property, or any part
thereof not shown by the public records.
5. Any liens for labor, services, or material, or claims to same which are not shown by the public
records.
6. Any titles or rights asserted by anyone including, but not limited to, persons, corporations, governments, or other entities, to tidelands, or lands comprising the shores or bottoms of navigable
streams, lakes, bays, oceans, or gulf, or lands beyond the line of the harbor or bulkhead lines established or changed by the United States Government or riparian rights, if any.
7. Any unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions in patents or in acts authorizing the issuance thereof; water rights, claims or titles to water.
8. Community property, dower, courtesy or homestead rights, if any, of any spouse of the insured.
9. The lien of all taxes and assessments for the year 19
, and thereafter.
10. Restrictive covenants affecting the property above described.

11. Taxes for the year 1982 were paid in the amount of $338.66, T&xes for
the year 1983 are now accruing as a lien but are not yet due or payable,
SERIAL NUMBER: KK-3 ^
/^~
12.^ Said property is included within the boundaries of Weber Basin Water
/Ocopservancy District, South Summit Fire Protection District, South Summit
Xemetery Maintenance District, Special District #7, and is subject to any
charges and assessments levied by them as a result of services provided.
//13\ Rio^fcs of way for any roads, ditches, canals or transmission lines now
/
^-eJcisting over, under or across said property.
^7

Any and all outstanding oil, gas, mining and mineral rights, etc.,
Q together with the right of the proprietor of a vein or lode to extract
his ore therefrom should the same be found to penetrate or intersect
the premises, and the right of ingress and egress for the use of said
rights.

14. WVRRANrtY DEED
Dated: January 29, 1953
Deeded To: MASON CONSTRUCTION, INC.
~**\
Book: U Page: 332
"As a part of the consideration for this Deed, the Grantee agrees not
to use the above described property to conduct a business, trade or
manufacture of any sort or nature, no buildings shall be erected thereon
except one private dwelling house with a garage appurtenant thereto. Any
violation of the above mentioned restrictions shall cause this Deed to
become null and void."

DEED OF TRUST
Dated: September 18, 1981

tfL

Amount: $97,000.00 Plus Interest

£/^-?3
t * eJ<G ,$£?
<AJ$ -<jjX I'"^;

%&/

Trustor: F. KENT NANCE and PATRICIA JEANNE NANCE
9j^J>^
__
yU
Beneficiary: FIRST SECURITY BANK OFa UTAH
*^'*^cj&l)$3''5~>
Trustee: SECURITY TITLE COMPANY ~ '^/ - \ - ? s / <&/s~>-ft£J*
Recorded: September 22, 1981

*<* * W

Entry No: 183798
'
T ^ 3 " %3
Book: M198 Page: 69ft ^ ^
^
DEED OF TRUST
'
^ H ^'
Dated: September 24, 1981
Amount: $57,147.00
Trustor: F. KENT NANCE and PATRICIA J. NANCE
Beneficiary: THE CITIZENS BANK
Trustee: SECURITY TITLE COMPANY
Recorded: October 8, 1981
Entry No: 184407
Book: M200 Page: 312

*<-& G^O/?*/?

*?*> £ s •*> "?
T & r?ry
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^
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JUDGEMENTS were checked against the names of the following and none
were found to be of record:
F. KENT NANCE
PATRICIA J. NANCE

- &

CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS

1. Tha tarm

mortgage." whan usad harain, shall include 6—6 of trust, trust daad. or othar security instrument

2. H tha proposad Insured has or acquiras actual knowledge of any defect, lien, encumbrance, adverse claim
or other matter affecting the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by this Commitment other
than those shown in Schedule B hereof, and shall fail to disclose such knowledge to tha Company in
writing, tha Company shall be relieved from liability for any loss or damage resulting from any act of
reliance hereon to tha extant tha Company is prejudiced by failure to so disclose such knowledge. If the
proposad Insurad shall disclose such knowledge to the Company, or if the Company otherwise acquires
actual knowledge of any such dafect. lien, encumbrance, adverse claim or othar matter, the Company at
its option may amend Schedule B of this Commitment accordingly, but such amendment shall not relieve
the Company from liability previously incurred pursuant to paragraph 3 of these Conditions w>6 Stipulations.
3. Liability of the Company under this Commitment shall be onfy to the named proposed Insured 9n6 such
parties included under tha definition of Insured in the form of policy or policies committed for and only
for actual loss incurred in reliance hereon in undertaking in good faith (a) to comply with tha requirements
hereof, or (b) to eliminate exceptions shown in Schedule B. or (c) to acquire or create the estate or interest
or mortgage thereon covered by this Commitment. In no event shall such liability exceed the amount stated
in Schedule A for the policy or policies committed for and such liability it subject to the insuring provisions,
the Conditions and Stipulations, and tha Exclusions from Coverage of the form of policy or policies committed
for in favor of the proposed Insured which are hereby incorporated by reference and are made a part
of this Commitment except as expressly modified herein
4 . Any action or actions or rights of action that the proposed Insured may hava or may bring against the
Company arising out of the status of the title to the estate or interest or the status of the mortgage thereon
covered by this Commitment must be based on 9r\6 are subject to the provisions of this Commitment

Mortgagee Policy
of Title
Insurance

fe^,,.*
If *3SX£r*

! £A
POLICY OF H U E INSURANCE Issued by USLIFE Title Insurance Company of Dallas
SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE. THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN
SCHEDULE B AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS
HEREOF, USLIFE Title Insurance Company of Dallas, a Texas corporation, herein called
the Company, insures, as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A, against loss or damage,
not exceeding the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A, and costs, attorneys fees
and expenses which the Company may become obligated to pay hereunder, sustained or
incurred by the insured by reason of:
1. Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested otherwise than as
stated therein:
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on such title;
3. Lack of a right of access to and from the land;
4. Unmarketability of such title;
5. The invalidity or unenforceability of the lien of the insured mortgage upon said estate
or interest except to the extent that such invalidity or unenforceability, or claim thereof,
arises out of the transaction evidenced by the insured mortgage and is based upon
a. usury, or
b. any consumer credit protection or truth in lending law;
6. The priority of any lien or encumbrance over the lien of the insured mortgage,
7. Any statutory lien for labor or material which now has gained or hereafter may gain
priority over the lien of the insured mortgage, except any such lien arising from an
improvement on the land contracted for and commenced subsequent to Date of Policy
not financed in whole or in part by proceeds of the indebtedness secured by the insured
mortgage which at Date of Policy, the insured has advanced or is obligated to advance; or
8. The invalidity or unenforceability of any assignment, shown in Schedule A. of the
insured mortgage or the failure of said assignment to vest title to the insured mongage
in the named insured assignee free and clear of all liens.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. USLIFE Title Insurance Company of Dallas has caused this
policy to be signed and sealed by its duly authorized officers in facsimile to be valid, as
of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A, only when it bears an authorized, original
countersignature.

jU/tf&
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ADDENDUM NO.
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Exclusions From Coverage
The following matters ere expressly excluded from the coverage
of this policy:
1. Any law. ordinance or governmental regulation (including but
not limited to building and zoning ordinances) restricting or
regulating or prohibiting the occupancy, use or enjoyment of
the land, or regulating the character, dimensions or location
of any improvement now or hereafter erected on the land, or
prohibiting a separation in ownership or a reduction in the
dimensions or area of the land, or the effect of any violation
of any such law, ordinance or governmental regulation.
2. Rights of eminent domain or governmental rights of police
power unless notice of the exercise of such rights appears in
the public records at Date of Policy.
3. Defects. Kens, encumbrances, adverse claims, or other matters.(a) created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured

claimant; (b) not known to the Company and not shown by th
public records but known to the insured claimant either a
Date of Policy or at the date such claimant acquired an estati
or interest insured by this policy or acquired the insured mort
gage and not disclosed in writing by the insured claimant tc
the Company prior to the date such insured claimant becarr*
an insured hereunder; (c) resulting in no loss or damage to the
insured claimant; (d) attaching 6r created subsequent to Dati
of Policy (except to the extent insurance is afforded herein as
to any statutory lien for labor or material).
Unenforceability of the lien of the insured mortgage because
of failure of the insured at Date of Policy or of any subsequent
owner of the indebtedness to comply with applicable "doing
business" laws of the state in which the land is situated.

Conditions and Stipulations
1. Definition of Terms
The following terms when used in this policy mean:
(a) Insured": the insured named in Schedule A. The term "insured" also includes (i) the owner of the indebtedness secured by
the insured mortgage and each successor in ownership of such
indebtedness (reserving, however, all rights and defenses as to any
such successor who acquires the indebtedness by operation of law
as distinguished from purchase including, but not limited to, heirs,
distributees, devisees, survivors, personal representatives, next of
kin or corporate or fiduciary successors that the Company would
have had against the successor's transferor), and further includes
(ii) any governmental agency or instrumentality which is an insurer
or guarantor under an insurance contract or guaranty insuring or
guaranteeing said indebtedness, or any part thereof, whether
named as an insured herein or not, and (iii) the parties designated
in paragraph 2 (a) of these Conditions and Stipulations.
(b) "insured claimant": an insured claiming loss or damage
hereunder.
(c) "knowledge": actual knowledge, not constructive knowledge or notice which may be imputed to an insured by reason of
any public records.
(d) "land": the land described, specifically or by reference in
Schedule A, and improvements affixed thereto which by law constitute real property; provided, however, the term "land" does not
include any property beyond the lines of the area specifically described or referred to in Schedule A, nor any right, title, interest,
estate or easement in abutting streets, roads, avenues, alleys, lanes,
ways or waterways, but nothing herein shall modify or limit the extent
to which a right of access to and from the land is insured by this policy.
(e) "mortgage": mortgage, deed of trust, trust deed, or other
•security instrument.
(f) "public records": those records which by.law impart constructive notice of matters relating to said land.

tality, if such agency or instrumentality is the insured claimant,
in the acquisition of such estate or interest in satisfaction of
its insurance contract or guaranty.

(b) Continuation of Insurance after Conveyance
of Title
The coverage of this policy shall continue in force as of Date
of Policy in favor of an insured so long as such insured retains an
estate or interest in the land, or holds an indebtedness secured by
a purchase money mortgage given by a purchaser from such insured, or so long as such insured shall have liability by reason of
covenants of warranty made by such insured in any transfer or
conveyance of such estate or interest; provided, however, this
policy shall not continue in force in favor of any purchaser from
such insured of either said estate or interest or the indebtedness
secured by a purchase money mortgage given to such insured.

3. Defense and Prosecution of Actions—Notice of
Claim to be given by an insured Claimant

(a) The Company, at its own cost and without undue delay, shall
provide for the defense of an insured in all litigation consisting of
actions or proceedings commenced against such insured, or
defenses, restraining orders or injunctions interposed against a
foreclosure of the insured mortgage or a defense interposed against
an insured in an action to enforce a contract for a sale of
the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage, or a sale of the
estate or interest in said land, to the extent that such litigation is
founded upon an alleged defect, lien, encumbrance, or other matter
insured against by this policy.
(b) The insured shall notify the Company promptly in writing
(i) in case any action or proceeding is begun or defense or restraining order or injunction is interposed as set forth in (a) above, (ii) in
case knowledge shall come to an insured hereunder of any claim of
title or interest which is adverse to the title to the estate or interest
or the lien of the insured mortgage, as insured, and which might
1 (a) C o n t i n u a t i o n of Insurance after Acquisition
cause loss or damage for which the Company may be liable by virtue
of Title
of this policy, or (iii) if title to the estate or interest or the lien of
This policy shall continue in force as of Date of Policy in favor of
the insured mortgage, as insured, is rejected as unmarketable. If
in insured who acquires all or any part of the estate or interest in
such prompt notice shall not be given to the Company, then as to
he land described in Schedule A by foreclosure, trustee's sale, consuch insured all liability of the Company shall cease and terminate
veyance in lieu of foreclosure, or other legal manner which disin regard to the matter or matters for which such prompt notice is
rharges the lien of the insured mortgage, and if the insured is a
required; provided, however, that failure to notify shall in no case
corporation, its transferee of the estate or interest so acquired,
prejudice the rights of any such insured under this policy unless the
provided the transferee is the parent or wholly owned subsidiary of
Company shall be prejudiced by such failure and then only to the
he insured; and in favor of any governmental agency or instrumen- extent of such prejudice.
ality which acquires all or any part of the estate or interest
(c) The Company shall have therightat Its own cost to institute and
pursuant to a contract of insurance or guaranty insuring or guaranwithout undue delay prosecute any action or proceeding or to do arty
aeing the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage; provided
other act which in its opinion may be necessary or desirable to establish
iat the amount of insurance hereunder after such acquisition,
the title to the estate or interest or the lien of the insured mortgage, as
xclustve of costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the Company
' insured, and the Company may take any appropriate action under the
iay become obligated to pay, shall not exceed the least of:
terms of this policy, whether or not it shall be liable thereunder, and shall
(i) the amount of insurance stated, in Schedule A;
not thereby concede liability or waive any provision of this policy.
(ii) the amount of the unpaid principal of the indebtedness as
defined in paragraph 8 hereof, plus interest thereon, expenses
(d) Whenever the Company shall have brought any action or interof foreclosure and amounts advanced to protect the lien of the
posed a defense as required or permitted by the provions of this policy
the Company mav mirtu>* ««« ** »*** |:*:—A-~ - - - *
insured mortgage and secured by said insured mortgage at
the time of acauisttion of •m*H •»«••••**- : -*
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SCHEDULE A

e of Policy: April 26, 1983 @ 4:00 p.m.
ount of Insurance $

GF No. D 2643

101,500.00
(435.00)

lame of Insured:

VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY
he estate or interest in the land described in this Schedule and which is encumbered by the insured mortgage is: (a fee.
sasehold, etc.)
_

fee simple
he estate or interest referred to herein is at Date of Policy vested in:

F. KENT NANCE & PATRICIA J. NANCE,
his wife, as joint tenants
tie mortgage, herein referred to as the insured mortgage, and the assignments thereof, if any, are described as
Hows:

DEED OF TRUST
Dated: April 25, 1983
Anount: $101,500.00
Trustor: F. KENT NANCE & PATRICIA J. NANCE, husband and wife
Beneficiary: VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY
Trustee: VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY
Recorded: April 26, 1983
Entry Number: 205040
Book: 258 Page: 542

e land referred to in this policy is described as follows:

Beginning 173.55 feet North and 1466.1 feet East of the Quarter
Section corner on the West line of Section 17, Township 3 South,
Range 7 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North
185.97 feet, more or less, to the South boundary line of State Road
Right of Way; thence along said boundary South 69°59' East 106.4
feet; thence South 148.78 feet; thence East 100 feet to the place of
beginning. Also being known and designated as Lot 3 of Kamp Kill
Rare Lots, according to the official plat thereof on file in the office
of the County Recorder of Sumrdt County. Together with a right of
way 20 feet wide being 10 feet on either side of the following described
centerline, being on a point on the South Quarter boundary line of
State Road Right of Way 632 feet North and 856; 1 feet East of the
Ouarter Section corner of the West line of said section 17; thence
South 468.5 feet East 1080 feet; thence North 40 feet, more or less,
tr% the*

Ct-at-o D « » # * o<#o»«- ~c t.i—

POLICY NO M 0 7 6 1 5 6

This Policy does not insure against loss or damage by reason of the following:

. Taxes for the yean I W ? were paid. SERIAL NUMBER:

KK 3

• Said property is included within the boundaries of the Weber Basin Water
Conservancy District, South Sumiit Fire Protection .District, South Summit
Cemetery Maintenance District, Special District #7 and is subject to any
charges and assessments levied by them as a result of services provided.
Charges are current.
Rights of way for any roads, ditches, canals or transmission lines now
existing over, under or across said property.
Any and all outstanding oil, gas, mining and mineral rights, etc.,
together with the right of the proprietor of a vein or lode to extract
his ore therefrom should the same be found to penetrate on intersect
the premises, and the rigfrt to ingress and egress for the use of said
rights.
WARRANIY DEED
Dated: January 29, 1953
Deeded to: MASON CONSTRUCTION, INC,
Book: U Page: 332
,f

As a part of the consideration for this Deed, the Grantee agrees not
to use the above described property to conduct a business, trade or
manufacture of any sort or nature, no buildings shall be erected thereon
except one private dwelling house with a garage appurtenant thereto. Any
violation of the above mentioned restrictions shall cause this Deed to
become null and void."

S C H E D U L E B - P A R T II
In addition to the matters set forth in Part I of this Schedule, the title to the estate or interest in the land descnbed or referred to
in Schedule A is subject to the following matters, if any be shown, but the Company insures that such matters Bt9 subordinate
to the lien or charge of the insured mortgage upon said estate or interest:

None

Endorsement
(to and forming a part of Policy of Title Insurance No. . . . r.'?*rP.

)

Issued by
USLIFE TITLE I N S U R A N C E Company of Dallas (Herein called the company)
The Company hereby insures against loss which said Insured shall sustain by reason of any of the following
matters
1 . Any incorrectness in the assurance which the Company hereby gives:
(a) That there ere no covenants, conditions, or restrictions under which the lien of the mortgage or deed
of trust referred to in Schedule A can be cut off. subordinated, or otherwise impaired.
(b) That there are no present violations on said land of any enforceable covenants, conditions, or restrictions;
(c) That, except as shown in Schedule B. there are no encroachments of buildings, structures, or improvements
located on said land onto adjoining lands, nor any encroachments onto said land of buildings, structures.
or improvements located on adjoining lands.
2 . (a) Any future violations on said land of any covenants, conditions, or restrictions occurring prior to acquisition
of title to said estate or interest by the Insured, provided such violations result in loss or impairment of the lien of
the mortgage referred to in Schedule A. or result in loss or impairment of the title to said estate or interest if the
Insured shall acquire such title in satisfaction of the indebtedness secured by such mortgage;
(b) Unmarketability of the title to said estate or interest by reason of any violations on said land, occurring prior to
acquisition of title to S9id estate or interest by the Insured, of any covenants, conditions, or restrictions.
3 . Damage to existing improvements, including lawns, shrubbery or trees:
(a) Which are located or encroach upon that ponion of the land subject to any easement shown in Schedule
B. which damage results from the exercise of the right to use or maintain such easement for the purposes for
which the same was granted or reserved;
(b) Resulting from the exercise of any right to use the surface of said land for the extraction or development
of the minerals excepted from the description of said land or shown as a reservation in Schedule B.
4 . Any final court order or judgment requiring removal from any land adjoining said land of any encroachment
shown in Schedule B.
The total liability of the Company under said policy and any endorsements attached thereto shall, however,
not exceed, in the aggregate, the face amount of said policy and the costs which the Company is obligated
under the schedules, conditions and stipulations thereof to pay
This endorsement is made a part of said policy and is subject to the schedules, conditions and stipulations
therein, except as modified by the provisions hereof.
This Endorsement is not to be construed as insuring the title as of any later date than the date of said policy,
except as herein expressly provided as to the subject matter hereof.
Signed under seal for the Company, but this Endorsement is to become valid only when it bears an authorized
countersignature.
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Endorsement
(to »r\d forming a part of Policy of Title Insurance No

M 076156

,

Issued by
USLIFE TITLE I N S U R A N C E Company of Dallas (Herein called the company)
The Company assures the Insured that at the date of said policy there is located on said land

A single family dwelling also known as:
The 7 Mile Marker of Highway 35
Woodiand, Utah 84036

and that the map attached to this policy shows the correct location and dimensions of the land described
in Schedule A as described by those records which under the recording laws impart constructive notice as
to said land
The Company hereby insures the Insured against loss which said Insured shall sustain in the event the assurances
herem shall prove to be incorrect.
The total liability of the Company under said policy 9nd any endorsements attached thereto shall, however, not
exceed, in the aggregate, the face amount of said policy and the costs which the Company is obligated under
the schedules, conditions and stipulations thereof to pay.
This endorsement is made a part of said policy and is subject to the schedules, conditions and stipulations
therein, except as modified by the provisions hereof.
Signed under seal for the Company, but this Endorsement is to become valid only when it bears an authorized
countersignature.

n..^

April 26, 1983
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INDORSEMENT
Fee $
Attached to Policy No. M 076156
Issued by
I H J F E TITLE INSURANCE Company of Dallas

The Company assures . . .
(a)

That by a valid assignment or assignments the beneficial interest under
the mortgage referred to in paragraph 4
of ALIA Schedule A
has been transferred to said Assured;
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MDKTCAGE CORPORATION

(b)

That there are no subsisting tax or assessment liens which are prior to
said mortgage except:

(c)

That there are no matters affecting the validity or priority of the lien of
said mortgage, other than those shown in said policy, except:

(d)

That there are no United States tax liens or bankruptcy proceedings affecting the title to said estate or interest shown by the public records, other
than those shown in said policy, except:

The Company hereby insures said Assured against any loss of principal, interest or other sums
secured by said mortgage, which said Assured shall sustain in the event that the assurances herein
shall prove to be incorrect.
The total liability of the Company under said policy and any indorsements therein shall not exceed,
in the aggregate, the face amount of said policy and costs which the Company is obligated under the
conditions and stipulations thereof to pay.
This indorsement is made a part of said policy and is subject to the schedules, conditions and stipulations therein, except as modified by the provisions hereof.
This indorsement is not to be construed as insuring the title to said estate or interest as of any later
date than the date of said policy, except as herein expressly provided as to the subject matter hereof.
Dated: July 13, 1983
USLIFE TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY of Dallas
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(Conditions arJ^^pulations c6ntinueo wnaconciuoed from reverae^^ of policy face)
(e) In all cases where this policy permmWr requires the Comthe acquisition of titlHB satd estate or interest as provided in
pany to prosecute or provide for the defense of any action or
paragraph 2(a| of these Conditions and Stipulations, shall not reproceeding, the insured hereunder shall secure to the Company
duce pro tanto the amount of the insurance afforded hereunder
the right to so prosecute or provide defense in such action or
except to the extent that such payments reduce the amount of the
proceeding, Bnd all appeals therein, and permit the Company to indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage.
use, at its option, the name of such insured for such purpose.
Payment in full by any person or voluntary satisfaction or release
Whenever requested by the Company, such insured shall give the
of the insured mortgage shall terminate all liability of the Company
Company all reasonable aid in any such action or proceeding, in
except as provided in paragraph 2(a) hereof.
effecting settlement, securing evidence, obtaining witnesses, or
(b) The liability of the Company shall not be increased by addiprosecuting or defending such action or proceeding, and the Comtional principal indebtedness created subsequent to Date of Policy,
pany shall reimburse such insured for any expense so incurred.
except as to amounts advanced to protect the lien of the insured
mortgage and secured thereby.
N o t i c e of Loss—Limitation of A c t i o n
No payment shall be made without producing this policy for enIn addition to the notices required under paragraph 3(b) of these
dorsement of such payment unless the policy be lost or destroyed.
Conditions and Stipulations, a statement in writing of any loss or
in which case proof of loss or destruction shall be furnished to the
damage for which it is claimed the Company is liable under this
satisfaction of the Company.
policy shall be furnished to the Company within 90 days after such
oss or damage shall have been determined and no right of action
Liability Noncumulative
shall accrue to an insured claimant until 30 days after such stateIf the insured acquires title to the estate or interest in satisfacment shall have been furnished. Failure to furnish such statement
tion of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage, or any
>f loss or damage shall terminate any liability of the Company
part thereof, it is expressly understood that the amount of insurinder this policy as to such loss or damage.
ance under this policy shall be reduced by any amount the Com-

I Options to Pay or Otherwise Settle Claims
The Company shall have the option to pay or otherwise settle
or or in the name of an insured claimant any claim insured against
r to terminate all liability and obligations of the Company herer)6^r by paying or tendering payment of the amount of insurance
nder this policy together with any costs, attorneys' fees and exenses incurred up to the time of such payment or tender of paylent by the insured claimant and authorized by the Company. In
ise loss or damage is claimed under this policy by an insured, the
ompany shall have the further option to purchase such indebted*ss for the amount owing thereon together with all costs,
torneys' fees and expenses which the Company is obligated
»reunder to pay. If the Company offers to purchase said indebted»ss as herein provided, the owner of such indebtedness shall
msfer and assign said indebtedness and the mortgage and any
^lateral securing the same to the Company upon payment therer as herein provided.

Determination and Payment of Loss
(a) The liability of the Company under this policy shall in no
se exceed the least of:
(i) the actual loss of the insured claimant; or
(ii) the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A, or, if applicable,
the amount of insurance as defined in paragraph 2(a) hereof; or
[iii) the amount of the indebtedness secured by the insured
mortgage as determined under paragraph 8 hereof, at the
time the loss or damage insured against hereunder occurs,
together with interest thereon.
b) The Company will pay, in addition to any loss insured against
this policy, all costs imposed upon an insured in litigation cari on by the Company for such insured, and all costs, attorneys'
s and expenses in litigation carried on by such insured with the
tten authorization of the Company.
c) When liability has been definitely fixed in accordance with
conditions of this policy, the loss or damage shall be payable
hin 30 days thereafter.

Limitation of Liability
lo claim shall arise or be maintainable under this policy (a) if
Company, after having received notice of an alleged defect,
or encumbrance insured against hereunder, by litigation or
trwise, removes such defect. Ken or encumbrance or estabBS the title, or the lien of the insured mortgage, as insured,
tin a reasonable time after receipt of such notice; (b) in the
nt of litigation until there has been a final determination by a
rt of competent jurisdiction, and disposition of all appeals
efrom, adverse to the title or to the lien of the insured morta, as insured, as provided in paragraph 3 hereof; or (c) for
Irty voluntarily assumed by an insured in settling any claim or
without Drior written consent of the Company.

Reduction of Liability
) All payments under this oolicv. exe*nt *»%#«»**«• -*-*-> « ~

pany may pay under any policy insuring a mortgage hereafter
executed by an insured which is a charge or lien on the estate or
interest described or referred to in Schedule A, and the amount so
paid shall be deemed a payment under this policy.

If: Subrogation Upon Payment or Settlement
Whenever the Company shall have settled a claim under this
policy, all right of subrogation shall vest in the Company unaffected by any act of the insured claimant, except that the owner of
the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage may release or
substitute the personal liability of any debtor or guarantor, or extend or otherwise modify the terms of payment, or release a portion of the estate or interest from the lien of the insured mortgage,
or release any collateral security for the indebtedness, provided
such act occurs prior to receipt by the insured of notice of any
claim of title or interest adverse to the title to the estate or interest
or the priority of the lien of the insured mortgage and does not
result in any loss of priority of the lien of the insured mortgage.
The Company shall be subrogated to and be entitled to all rights
and remedies which such insured claimant would have had against
any person or property \r\ respect to such claim had this policy not
been issued, and if requested by the Company, such insured
claimant shall transfer to the Company all rights and remedies
against any person or property necessary in order to perfect such
right of subrogation and shall permit the Company to use the
name of such insured claimant in any transaction or litigation involving such rights or remedies. If the payment does not cover the
loss of such insured claimant, the Company shall be subrogated to
such rights and remedies in the proportion which said payment
bears to the amount of said loss, but such subrogation shall be in
subordination to the insured mortgage. If loss of priority should
result from any act of such insured claimant, such act shall not
void this policy, but the Company, in that event, shall be required
to pay only that part of any losses insured against hereunder which
shall exceed the amount, if any, lost to the Company by reason of
the impairment of the right of subrogation.
Liability Limited to this Policy
This instrument together with all endorsements and other instruments, if any, attached hereto by the Company is the entire policy
and contract between the insured and the Company.
Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not based on negligence, and which arises out of the status of the Hen of the insured
mortgage or of the title to the estate or interest covered hereby
or any action asserting such claim, shall be restricted to the provisions and conditions and stipulations of this policy.
No amendment of or endorsement to this policy can be made
except by writing endorsed hereon or attached hereto signed by
either the President, a Vice President, the Secretary, an Assistant
Secretary, or validating officer or authorized signatory of the
Company.
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AUPKID J ^ m t U B . Attorney at Lew,
WBuW
alt Bs#fXth tooth
fait Uba City, Hub 14X02
?ALLET 1AME AMD TBJST COMPANY (barala eallad Traatoo) aa Trustee aadar tba
treat daad baraiaaftar partiaalarly described, doas hereby Eergaia, Sail aai Ceawey,
without warraaty. to VALLEY BANE AMD Tturr COMPAKY
1 1 7 7 . m e * c*>Jo* oV MtbtrCv.iiT f^Oi-i (herein oaUad Creates) a U af tba raal
property eiteste in tt» Qseaty of
tcmiT
t Itata of ttab t aoocrlbod aa

1 .jug*- Y

(goo attacbad labiblt "A", far legal description, attacbad barata aad
by tbia rafaraaca Bade a part hereof.)

ice

t 7*ai

ia aedc paraaaat toftwEgowcapcgafarTadapoa sTrmtst>br tb^
t r u s t daad bstwaea f. KENT NANCE AND PATRICIA J . IUL1LE
aa Trustor, tbo Traatoo barala, and
INTERM0ONTAIN THRIFT AND LOAN
mm Beneficiary, racordad Moveaber 18, 1983
, aa Entry Mo. 213204

l a Book 279

9

at Page 60
#
guaadt
County, Utah Becorda, aad after f u l f i l l *
of tba aoadltioaa apaclflad i a aaid truat daad autboriaiAi tbia conveyance aa f a l ls
(a) ftafaalt aecurrad la tbo obligations for which such truat daad was given
aa aaearity aad tba laaaficiary aade daaaad upoa said Trustaa to s a i l aaid proparty par*
auaat to tbo t a n s af aaid truat daad. Motlcs of dsfault was racordod as Entry Mo.
227277
• 1* Book 320
, at Fags 382 • County loeords (aad ia tba off las
of tho locordar af aaeb atbar county ia which tbo proporty dascrlbad ia said Trust Daad9
or au/ part charoof, ia eitaatad), tba aatura af such dafault baiag aa aat forth la
aaid aotlea af dafault» aad copy af such aotlca was aailad by eartlflad aall to oaeb
poraoa aao racordod a rofusat therefore* Such dafault s t i l l existed at tba tiaa af sola.
(a) Mara than tbraa aontbs aftar racardatloa af aaid aotlca af dafault,
Trustaa gave aotlca af tba tin* aad alaca af tba asls of said proparty by eartlflad
• a l l by pootiag la a coaapiouoao alaca aa tba proparty to ba sold, aad ia thrss public
places af each city or couaty fit which tba property, or aoaa part thereof, i s situated,
aad by publlabiag ia a newspaper having a general circulation ia each couaty ia which
the property ia situs ted.
(a) Tba provisions, recitals aad contents of the Notice of Default referred
to i a paragraph (a) eapra, shall ba aad tbay are hereby incorporated herein aad aade aa
integral part hereof, for a l l purposes as though set forth herein et length.
(d) All raajuiraaaata af law regarding the sailing, posting, publication bad
reeordlag af aotlca af dafault, sod aotlca af sale, aad af a l l atbar aaticea have beam
coaplled with.
(a) Trustee, at tba tiaa aad place of eele fixed by aaid aotlca, at public
auction, ia aaa parcel, struck aff to Oran tee, being the highest bidder therefore, tba
proparty herein deocrlbed, far tba aunt af $ 11,941.45
, eubject however, to a l l
prior liens aad eacaabraacaa. l a parson or corporation offered to take any part af
aaid property leas then tba whole thereof for tbo aaouat af principal, interest, ad*
•te.
EM VRKEgg MBEBEOP, tba greater, pursuant to a resolution of i t s board af
Directors, baa caused i t s corporate aaaa to ba hereunto eubecrlhed by i t s .
aad i t a eorporete seal to be affixed this 4 t n day af
April
• -*gs
WJ

Jft|

1A1LEY BANK AMD TBDETtt*PAMT,Trustee

fTATI Of UTAM Vatateh i M
asslstsat Vi/s President 4 Msnsgsr
000b i t Of MMbtieut )
^
0a tba
4th
day af
t» r tl
t M g s • faraoaaliy appeared
before aa
Clair J. Mortoa
• *ho being by m duly lawqga, aid
aay that he, tbo aaid
plslr J. Norton
i s tba Assiatsnt Vice President 4 Mg
of VALLEY BAM AMD TBOfT QpMPAMY, Trustee, the corporation that s a o c u t ^ g b e ^ r t g o i a g
instrument aa euch Trustee by authority of a resolution of i t s boartf>{ iiVs>tgHi #»aaid
Cialr J. Norton
t duly acknow^fea * © a ¥ j t l \ t * a l d
aorporatlon aiecatad tbo aaaa mm auch Truetee.

M*tM7
My fab|ia
W OMriNlN M»iK»t MffMt J. INT
iMtiilllM
Mitfray. uelh
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mtiiT A
rA*t:t:i. I :
gU.lttUNC 115.55 f»Ht north end 1444.1 foot Eoet of the Quarter Section Corner
««t the Hem line of Section 17, Townnhip 3 houth, Senge 7 Kaet, l « l t Ufce Moo
ond h e r i d i a n 9 and running thence n o r t h 1 4 5 . f 7 f e e t , acre or l o a n , t o tin? South
peundary l i n e of S t a t e good r i g h t - o f - u e y ; theaco eleag M i a boundary South
4 9 * 5 9 f Coot 104.4 f o o t ; toeoce Sooth 144.74 foot; thence beet I M foot to too
pUiiV of ftgClNNINi;.
ALSO tu ing known and designated a« Lot 3 KAHP KILL KAIE LOTS, according to tho
p l a t thereof on f i l e U the o f f i c o of the County fcecordcr of Suooiit County, Utah.
TiH.ITMKk w i t h .1 rljcht-of-vay 20 f e c i wide being 10 feet on e i t h e r slda of tho
l«ij lowing deecrieed r e n t c r l i n * , being on o point on tho Sooth quarter houndery
l i m * of S t a t e HUu%d r i g h t - o f - w a y ; 612 feet North mnd 456.1 feet Cast of quarter
oection corner ««n We*: j l n e of * * i d Section 17; thence South 464.5 f e e t t e a t
Jcwo i f t i ; thence Morth 40 f e e t . wire or lean' to the State goad r i g h t - o f - w a y .

IAKOX 2 :
U**iKWLiMC North 374.35 feet and Eaat 1419.9 feet froo the Heat one quarter
. . • n i i T «»f Section 1 7 , Townehip 3 South, Hani;c 7 Eaet, S a l t Lake nose aod
i i e r i d i . m ; thence South 49 # 59 v fc.i*t 49.17 f e e t ; thence South 45.97 f e e t ; thence
WrKt 71.0 f e e t ; thence North 13 # 33 V 44 N Ka*t 105*75 f e e t to the point of
*vi;iuiiiti£.
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